Maryland case law › Gleaton v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary

Gleaton v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary

238 Md. 135 (1965) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: DeniedPrescott, C. J.✓ Good law
SummaryGleaton filed a post-conviction application for relief from his conviction, raising numerous federal and state constitutional claims. Judge Rasin of the Circuit Court held a full evidentiary hearing on all constitutional questions that had not previously been fully litigated and finally determined, and thereafter filed a comprehensive opinion setting forth findings of fact and applying the law to those facts. Judge Rasin concluded that, under the tests and standards laid down by the Supreme Court, Gleaton had been denied no state or federal constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief Judge Prescott, reviewed the application and found that this procedure—a full evidentiary hearing followed by a reasoned opinion applying federal constitutional standards—was precisely the course prescribed by recent Supreme Court decisions, citing Fay v. Noia, Townsend v. Sain, Sande
Questions presented
  • Whether the applicant was denied any state or federal constitutional rights entitling him to post-conviction relief.
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Prescott, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In the instant case, Judge Rasin afforded the applicant a full evidentiary hearing on all federal and state constitutional questions raised by him, upon which he had not previously had a full evidentiary hearing and a final determination as to his constitutional rights, (and, perhaps, more: see Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271 ). The judge, thereafter, filed a comprehensive opinion setting forth his findings of fact. He then applied the facts as he found them to the law appertaining thereto, which disclosed that, applying the tests and standards as laid down by the Supreme Court, applicant had been denied no state or federal constitutional rights.

This, we think, is the course prescribed by the Supreme Court 136 in its recent decisions, relative to federal constitutional rights. Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 ; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 ; Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 ; Henry v. Mississippi., 379 U, S. 443. See also, Meader, “Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Post Conviction Review,” 50 A.B.A.J. No. 10. 1 (There is no question involved in this application relating to an effectual waiver, or forfeiture, of any constitutional rights. Henry v. Mississippi, supra.) Therefore, we shall deny the application for the reasons set forth in the opinion of Judge Rasin, except in the last sentence dealing with Question 7.

We think his conclusion with reference to Question 7, as it applied to this application, was clearly correct; however, the last sentence encompasses a broader scope as to the use of an inadmissible confession (in the trial) at a sentencing hearing than is necessary to decide in this application. The judge had already, correctly, upheld the confession as being freely and voluntarily given. Application denied. 1 . It does seem a wasteful extravagance to require a State, after it has prescribed reasonable procedural rules and provided the personnel for conducting a full and fair criminal prosecution, including the right of appeal, to continue the expense of further litigation by the metaphysical quibbling as to whether a defendant has “waived” or “forfeited” his right to object to evidence presented at the trial to which there was no objection made in accordance with the requirements of the State rules, even though the defendant was represented by three counsel.

Henry v. Mississippi, supra. However, although possibly regrettable, it is not within our prerogative to prevent such expense to the State of Maryland, or any other State; it is not for us “to reason why.”