Maryland case law › Greenholtz v. Haeffer

Greenholtz v. Haeffer

53 Md. 184 (1880) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedBrent, J.✓ Good law
SummaryIn 1866, Anna Greenholtz, a married woman, executed two promissory notes to Emanuel Burns for $450 each, and to secure them, a paper purporting to be a mortgage on her separate real property in Manchester, Carroll County. Her husband did not join in either the notes or the mortgage. The only consideration for the notes was a balance due by her husband for a milk route he had purchased. After assignments, the claim came to the appellee, who filed a bill to subject the lots to payment. The appellee conceded that the notes and mortgage were not enforceable against Mrs. Greenholtz personally because of her coverture, but argued that the paper was evidence of a contract enforceable against her separate estate in equity. The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Brent, J., held that the only mode for a married woman to convey her real estate is prescribed by the 11th section of Article 45 of the
Questions presented
  • Can a married woman convey her separate real estate by mortgage without her husband joining in the conveyance, when the property was not conveyed to her with a special power to dispose of it?
  • Can an invalid mortgage and notes, unenforceable against a married woman due to coverture, be enforced as a contract against her separate estate in equity?
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Brent, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On the 8th of September, 1866, Mrs. Anna Greenholtz, then and now the wife of James W. Greenholtz, executed to Emanuel Burns two single hills each for $450, one payable on the 1st day of September, 1868, with interest from the 1st of September, 1866, and the other payable on the 1st of September, 1869, with interest also from the 1st of September, 1866. To secure the payment of these notes she executed to said Burns at the same time what purports to he a mortgage upon certain lots belonging to her as her separate property and lying in Manchester, Carroll County. The husband did not join in the execution of the notes or mortgage.

The weight of the testimony establishes the fact that the only consideration of these notes was a balance due by the husband for a milk route, which he, some time before, had purchased. After assignments and re-assignments the claim against Mrs. Greenholtz finally came into the hands of the appellee, who filed his hill to subject the lots mentioned to its payment. We do not understand that it is contended on the part of the appellee that the paper signed by Mrs. Greenholtz can he enforced as a mortgage. On the contrary the allegation in the hill of complaint is, “ that whilst said paper purporting and intended to he a mortgage is not, and the said single hills are not, binding on and enforceable against the said Anna Greenholtz as such, by reason of her coverture, yet the same are evidence of a contract on her part, enforceable against said parcel of land and premises, as her separate estate in equity.” 186 There can he no question that the only mode in which the wife can convey her' real estate is in the manner directed in the 11th section of Article 45 of the Code.

To render such a conveyance valid the husband must join in the conveyance, whether the same be absolute or by way of mortgage. Of course if the estate has been conveyed to the wife as her separate property, with a power annexed to dispose of and convey it in a particular mode, the power can be executed by her without reference to this section. But where the property is held by her as in this case, without any special power given by the grantor to convey, the conveyance can only be validly executed by the husband joining, and becoming a party to it with the wife. To hold that the claim of the appellee could be enforced against the separate property of Mrs. G-reenholtz, upon the ground of a contract, as set up in the bill of complaint, would present the anomaly of giving to supposed obligations, confessedly invalid and not binding upon her, the same effect that could be accomplished if they were ever so valid and binding.

This cannot be ; and we see no ground upon which the bill of the apjsellee can be maintained. The case of Tiernan vs. Poor & Wife, 1 G. & J., 215 , is a very different case from the present. There the husband had united with the wife in the execution of the mortgage. It contained all the apt terms and necessary parties to make valid such an instrument, and was liable to the objection only of informality in the acknowledgment by the wife.

While the Court did not uphold it as a mortgage, in the legal and technical sense of that term, they treated it as evidence of a contract, which would be enforced under proceedings for a special performance. Here the husband is no party to any contract to convey, and a special performance by the wife alone would not satisfy the requirements of the 11th section, or give to the 187 appellee any conveyance more valid as a mortgage than the one he now holds. (Decided 10th March, 1880.) The decree helow will he reversed and the hill dismissed. Decree reversed, and bill dismissed, with costs.