Maryland case law › Konig v. Mayor of Baltimore

Konig v. Mayor of Baltimore

129 Md. 700 (1917) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: Affirmed✓ Good law
SummaryThis case arose from a prior appeal between the same parties in which the Court of Appeals, deeming it proper that the appellant be protected from expenses connected with the proceeding, remanded the case with directions that the lower court allow the appellant costs and counsel fees. On remand, the lower court considered an agreed statement of facts showing that the bill in the case had been filed at the instance of another party, under an agreement that the appellant was to be protected and indemnified against all costs and counsel fees. Based on that agreed statement, the lower court decreed that no counsel fees should be allowed. The appellant appealed that decree. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because counsel were not employed by the appellant, and because their services were not rendered on the faith of any agreement on the part of the appellant that they should be pa
Questions presented
  • Whether the lower court erred in decreeing that no counsel fees should be allowed to the appellant, notwithstanding the prior mandate of the Court of Appeals directing that the appellant be allowed costs and counsel fees.
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. In a former appeal between the same parties, * the Court of Appeals, deeming it proper that the appellant in that appeal should be protected from expenses connected with the proceeding, in remanding the case directed the lower court to allow the appellant costs and counsel fees. It appearing in the lower court, from an agreed statement of facts, that the bill in the case had been filed at the instance of another party, under an agreement that the appellant was to be protected and indemnified against all costs and counsel fees, it was decreed that no counsel fees should be allowed; on appeal, in affirming such decree, it was: Held, that as counsel were not employed by the appellant, and since their services were not rendered on the faith of any agreement on the part of the appellant that they should be paid by him, the appellant had not incurred the expenses of counsel fees for which the allowance provided for in the opinion † was intended to protect him.