Maryland case law › Moss v. Director

Moss v. Director

279 Md. 561 (1977) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: DeniedOrth, J. (dissenting)✓ Good law
SummaryThis case involves a dissent by Judge Orth from the Court of Appeals' decision to assume jurisdiction over a defective delinquent proceeding. Edward Arnold Moss was found to be a defective delinquent by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and ordered confined to Patuxent Institution for an indeterminate period. Moss applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which granted the application, transferred the case to its appeal docket, and affirmed the lower court's order. Moss v. Director, 32 Md. App. 66, 359 A.2d 236 (1976). The Court of Appeals then granted certiorari. In his dissent, Judge Orth argues that the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction under Maryland Code (1974, 1975 Cum. Supp.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 12-202, which provides that '[n]o review by way of certiorari may be granted by the Court of Appeals in a case or proceeding in
Questions presented
  • Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review by certiorari a decision of the Court of Special Appeals granting leave to appeal in a defective delinquent proceeding, when § 12-202 prohibits such review?
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Orth, J., dissenting: It is my opinion that the Court of Appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Edward Arnold Moss was found to be a defective delinquent by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The court thereupon ordered Moss to be confined in Patuxent Institution as a defective delinquent for an indeterminate period. Moss applied for leave to appeal from that order to the Court of Special Appeals.

The application was granted. The case was transferred to the appeal docket, briefs were filed, and argument heard. The order of the lower court was affirmed. Moss v. Director, 32 Md. App. 66 , 359 A. 2d 236 (1976). 570 Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl.

Vol.) Art. 31B, § 11, pertaining to applications for leave to appeal in defective delinquent proceedings, includes the provision: “If the application for leave to appeal is granted, the procedure for appeal shall conform to the rules of the Court of Special Appeals.” Maryland Rule 1094 c provides in material part: “If leave to appeal is granted, unless the Court [of Special Appeals] otherwise directs, further proceedings shall be had pursuant to this chapter as if the order granting leave to appeal were the order of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 1012 (Appeal — Times for Filing).” Maryland Code (1974, 1975 Cum. Supp.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings, Article § 12-201, confers upon the Court of Appeals the power to issue a writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals in any case or proceeding pending in or decided by the Court of Special Appeals upon appeal from a circuit court or an orphans’ court or the Maryland Tax Court “[e]xcept as provided in § 12-202. .. .” Section 12-202 reads: No review by way of certiorari may be granted by the Court of Appeals in a case or proceeding in which the Court of Special Appeals has denied or granted: (1) Leave to prosecute an appeal in a post conviction proceeding; • (2) Leave to prosecute an appeal in a defective delinquent proceeding; (3) Leave to appeal from a refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus sought for the purpose of determining the right to bail or the appropriate amount of bail. To me, there is no ambiguity whatsoever in the dictates of § 12-202. The plain and certain language leaves nothing to be construed or interpreted.

The sure legislative intent is clearly expressed in the command that “[n]o review by way of certiorari may be granted by the Court of Appeals in a case or proceeding in which the Court of Special Appeals has denied or granted. ..” leave to appeal in any of the three 571 specified proceedings, one of which is the proceeding here — a defective delinquent proceeding. The Court of Appeals has acknowledged that it has no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Court of Special Appeals granting or denying leave to appeal under § 12-202 in a post conviction proceeding. Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 506, n. 4 , 341 A. 2d 388 (1975), Smith, J. dissenting on other grounds. But the Court justified review, despite the provisions of the statute, in this way: However, once the Court of Special Appeals grants leave to appeal in such a case and transfers the case to its appeal docket, the matter takes the posture of a regular appeal, and we do have jurisdiction under § 12-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to review the Court of Special Appeals’ decision on the appeal itself.

As it is patent that there is no reasonable distinction to be made between a post conviction proceeding and a defective delinquent proceeding in the contemplation of § 12-202, it is fair to assume that review here was granted on the same rationale as it was in Jourdan . I cannot agree that merely because procedures adopted to bring a granted application for leave to appeal to argument before the Court of Special Appeals are the same as those to bring a direct appeal to argument, the application for leave to appeal attains the status of a direct appeal so as to confer on the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review the proceeding when such review is so plainly prohibited by § 12-202. The position of the Court of Appeals is manifestly incongruous in that its reasoning does not serve to permit a review of a defective delinquent or post conviction proceeding when the application for leave to appeal is denied by the Court of Special Appeals, no matter what the ground stated in the opinion accompanying the denial. And, perhaps of even more significance, is that under the reasoning of the Court of Appeals it may not review such a proceeding when the Court of Special Appeals grants the application for leave to appeal and does not transfer the case to the appeal docket 572 but, as it may under the rules, simply issues an opinion in which the order appealed from is affirmed, reversed or modified, or the case remanded for further proceedings, without briefs being filed or argument heard.

Whether it is advisable for the Court of Appeals to have power to review by way of certiorari decisions of the Court of Special Appeals under grants of leave to appeal is not here relevant. If it is advisable, it may be properly accomplished by legislative action. What the Court is doing by assuming jurisdiction in the face of the legislative prohibition is, I believe, putting judicial preference before legislative intent. I think that the petition for writ of certiorari should have been denied for lack of jurisdiction.