Maryland case law › Peters v. League

Peters v. League

13 Md. 58 (1859) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: AffirmedTuck, J.✓ Good law
SummaryThis was an appeal from a decree of the equity court refusing to enjoin the execution of a judgment of condemnation obtained by attachment process. The appellant, Peters, had been served as garnishee with an attachment laid in his hands on a judgment against Luke League. Peters sought an injunction, arguing that the judgment was obtained by surprise and that he was privileged from service of the attachment because he was a member of the Baltimore City Council actually engaged in his duties. The Court of Appeals (Tuck, J.) affirmed the decree. The Court held that the evidence showed the attachment was in fact served on the appellant, so there was no ground of surprise to justify enjoining execution; he could have made all proper defenses before the justice of the peace. The Court further held that the validity of the judgment against Luke League, which was the basis of the attachment, cou
Questions presented
  • Whether the appellant is entitled to an injunction to enjoin the execution of the judgment of condemnation on the ground of surprise in obtaining the judgment?
  • Whether the validity of the judgment against Luke League, which was the basis of the attachment, can be assailed collaterally in this proceeding?
  • Whether the authority of the justice who issued the warrant against Luke League can be inquired into on this appeal?
  • Whether the appellant, as a member of the Baltimore City Council, was privileged from service of the attachment, and if so, whether he can obtain relief by injunction?
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Tuck, J., delivered the opinion of this court. The evidencie shows, that the process of attachment was, in fact, served on the appellant; there is therefore no jurisdiction for enjoining the execution, on the ground of surprise, in obtaining the judgment of condemnation. He might have made ail proper defences before the justice of the peace. We cannot, on this appeal, inquire into the authority of the justice who issued the warrant against Luke League, on which the judgment was rendered against him; and which is said to have been the basis of the attachment laid in the hands of the appellant.

The validity of that judgment cannot be assailed collaterally in the present proceeding. It-is supposed, that the appellant was privileged from the sovvice of the attachment; and especially while in the actual discharge of his duties as a member of one of the councils of Baltimore. If this be admitted, it will not follow that the party can obtain relief in the way proposed. Service of process on a privileged person is not void; it is treated as an irregularity, even in cases where, under the process, a party may be held to bail.

It may be waived by a trial or confession of judgment; and this shows that it does not avoid the proceedings, for what is a nullity cannot be cured. There are many cases in which the exemption has been claimed by plea, or motion, in the particular case; but none, as far as we are informed, where equity has interfered by injunction. In Prentis vs. Commonwealth, 6 Rand., 697 , where the subject was examined with care, on the application' of a member of the Legislature, it is said: “We are satisfied that the courts may not, ex officio, take notice of the existence of the privilege. It results, from its nature and character, that if may be waived, and therefore ought to be claimed whenever relied on.The judicial history of the question does not furnish an example of the allowance of the privilege, but upon plea, or upon motion, tendered or made, at the period proper for the consideration thereof by the court, whose proceedings are sought 64 to be abated or suspended.” ® * * * “The proof of the facts upon which it rests, are easy of attainment, because they are few, and may be adduced, as well in the absence, as in the presence of the party.” We consider this decision altogether consistent with the authorities upon' the subject: (Decided February 8th, 1859.) It is worthy of remark, that Peers and members of Parliament were liable at common law to be sued though they could not be arrested on writs of capias.

Here the process was an attachment, with a summons to the party as garnishee; therefore the supposed analogy between members of the Baltimore City Councils and of Parliament would not aid the appellant: If there was privilege in respect to the place, the service was not thereby avoided, whatever penalties the officer might have incurred by his alleged contempt, if the body had thought proper to vindicate its dignity against such intrusion. See 3 Bl. Com., 289. Sewell on Shff's., 133, (46 Law Lib.) 1 Sell.

Pr., 58. Fortnam vs. Rokeby, 4 Taunt., 668. Bouv. Bac.

Abr. Privilege, C. 5. 1 Tidd’s Pr. Ch., 6, 136, 217. Macnamara on Nullities, 6, 64.

Bartlett vs. Hebbes, 5 Term Rep., 686. Decree affirmed, with costs.