Maryland case law › Segall v. Mayor of Baltimore

Segall v. Mayor of Baltimore

273 Md. 647 (1975) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: Affirmed✓ Good law
SummaryAppellants Philip Segall et al. challenged a trial court order that permitted the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the City) to take immediate possession of property sought to be condemned under the "quick take" provisions of Article III, § 40A of the Maryland Constitution. The appellants argued that the City failed to comply with Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (1969) § 21-16(a), as amended by Chapter 420, Acts of 1972, which requires a petition for immediate possession to state "the reasons therefor." The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in a per curiam opinion, rejected this contention. The Court found that the City's petition referred to an attached affidavit, which stated that all other property interests in the ten disposition lot areas had been acquired, and that demolition and sale of the entire site areas could not be completed until possession and title of the subj
Questions presented
  • Did the City's petition for immediate possession comply with the requirement of Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (1969) § 21-16(a), as amended by Chapter 420, Acts of 1972, that the petition state "the reasons therefor"?
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Per Curiam: Appellants, Philip Segall et al., here complain that a trial judge erred in refusing to set aside an order permitting the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the City) to enter into 648 immediate possession of property sought to be condemned under the “quick take” provisions of Maryland Constitution, Art. III, § 40A. The basis of their claim is the requirement of Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (1969) § 21-16 (a) as amended by Chapter 420, Acts of 1972, that a petition for immediate possession state “the reasons therefor.” They say the City failed to comply. The short answer to this contention is that the City’s petition referred to an attached affidavit. That affidavit said “[t]hat all other property interests in the ten disposition lot areas aforesaid ha[d] been acquired, and demolition and sale of the entire site areas [could] not be completed until possession and title of the subject property interests [were] granted to the City.” This complied with the statute.

For this reason we have not addressed ourselves to the City’s motion to dismiss the appeal. Order affirmed; appellants to pay the costs; mandate to issue forthwith.