Maryland case law › Snyder v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary

Snyder v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary

227 Md. 644 (1961) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: DeniedPer Curiam✓ Good law
SummarySnyder was convicted in 1955 in the Circuit Court for Washington County of statutory rape and perverted sex practices and sentenced to consecutive terms of ten and two years. In 1959 he filed a post-conviction petition alleging he had not been present when the jury returned its verdicts, and he requested that Judge McLaughlin, the trial judge, not be present at the hearing. A hearing was held before Judge Fraley, at which Judge McLaughlin testified that Snyder had been in the courtroom when the verdicts were returned; Snyder's trial counsel and the prosecuting State's Attorney testified similarly. Judge Fraley dismissed the petition, and Snyder did not seek leave to appeal. Snyder then filed a second petition in the same court, reiterating his former complaint, raising several matters he could have raised in the original petition, and complaining of Judge McLaughlin's testimony against h
Questions presented
  • Whether Snyder's present complaints, other than the complaint relating to Judge McLaughlin's testimony, are grounds for relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act when they were raised or could reasonably have been raised in his original petition.
  • Whether Judge McLaughlin's testifying at Snyder's post-conviction hearing entitles Snyder to relief, where neither Snyder nor his counsel objected to the testimony and Snyder did not seek leave to appeal from the dismissal of that petition.
  • Whether Code (1960 Supp.), Art. 27, Sec. 645G, prohibits the judge who presided at a petitioner's trial from testifying at his post-conviction hearing.
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Per Curiam. The petitioner was convicted in 1955 in the Circuit Court for Washington County for the crimes of statutory rape and perverted sex practices. Pie was sentenced to ten years on the first charge and to two years on the second, the sentences to run consecutively. In 1959, Snyder filed a petition in the same Circuit Court under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, in which his primary complaint was that he had not been present in the courtroom when the jury had returned its verdicts.

Snyder specifically requested in his petition that Judge McLaughlin, who had presided at his trial, not be present at the hearing. Subsequently a hearing was held before Judge Fraley on the petition. At that hearing Judge McLaughlin appeared and testified that Snyder had indeed been in the courtroom when the jury returned its verdicts. Snyder’s trial counsel and the State’s Attorney who prosecuted Snyder testified similarly.

Judge Fraley thereafter dismissed the petition, and Snyder did not seek leave to appeal from that dismissal. Now Snyder has filed a second petition in the same court, in which he reiterates his former complaint, complains of several matters which he could have raised in his original petition, and further complains of Judge McLaughlin’s testifying against him at his hearing. Judge Fraley dismissed the second petition, and Snyder now seeks leave to appeal to this Court. As Judge Fraley found in his memorandum opinion, all of Snyder’s present complaints, with the exception of the one relating to Judge McLaughlin’s testimony, either were raised in the original Post Conviction petition or could reasonably have been.

They are no longer, therefore, grounds for relief under the Act. Code (1960 Supp.), Art. 27, Sec. 645H; Hobbs v. Warden, 219 Md. 684, 686 . As to the complaint relating to Judge McLaughlin’s testimony, neither the petitioner nor his counsel objected to such testimony at the hearing, and the 646 petitioner did not seek leave to appeal from the dismissal of that petition. Moreover, Code (1960 Supp.), Art. 27, Sec. 645G, does not, as Snyder maintains, prohibit the judge who presided at a petitioner’s trial from testifying at his Post Conviction hearing; it merely prohibits him from presiding at the hearing without the petitioner’s consent.

Application denied.