Maryland case law › State v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad

State v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad

48 Md. 49 (1878) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: Other✓ Good law
SummaryThis case involves a dispute over whether the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company and its property were exempt from state taxation under the 18th section of its 1826 charter. The opinion provided consists solely of two dissenting opinions by Stewart, J., and Bowie, J. Stewart, J., dissented on the ground that the 18th section of the Act of 1826, ch. 123, did not exempt the company or its property from taxation, but only the shares of capital stock. He further argued that even if an exemption existed, it was surrendered by the company's acceptance of the Act of 1835, ch. 395 (the eight million loan bill), which required the company to abandon any exemption from taxation. Bowie, J., also dissented, expressing profound respect for earlier tax cases but disagreeing with the doctrine that shares of stock represent all the franchises and property of the corporation, and thus that exemption of sh
Questions presented
  • Whether the 18th section of the Act of 1826, ch. 123, exempts the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company and its property from taxation, or only the shares of its capital stock.
  • Whether the company, by accepting the Act of 1835, ch. 395, surrendered any exemption from taxation it may have had under its charter.
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Stewart, J., filed the following dissenting opinion: Erom the view I take of the questions involved in this case, it is not of much practical importance to inquire as to the extent of the immunity from taxation, granted to the holders of the shares of the capital stock in the Balto. & O. R. R. Co., hy the provisions of the 18th section of the Act of 1826, ch. 123, which created the corporation. Erom the peculiar terms employed in that section, vesting the property consisting of “the road or roads with all their works, improvements and profits, and all the machinery of transportation used on said road,” in the said company and their successors forever; and making the shares of the capital stock personal estate; according to the strict principles of construction, now recognized as applicable to immunity from taxation ; there is great force in the argument of the Attorney General in maintaining that the 18th section does not warrant the extension of the exemption, beyond the shares of the capital stock, to the company or its property. The stockholders have not the ownership of the property or franchises of the corporation ; on the contrary, the 84 property, including the franchises, is vested in and belongs to the company, the artificial person created by the grant, and required to perform all the duties incumbent upon it. The stockholders can only assert their rights to any dividends accruing from the employment of the property of the company and its franchises.

Gordon vs. Appeal Tax Court, 3 Howard, 150 ; Van Allen vs. Assessors, 3 Wall., 584 ; Delaware R. Tax Case, 18 Wall., 229 -234; Wilmington R. R. Co. vs. Reid, 13 Wall., 264 ; 20 Wallace, 36. The legal title to the property being in the company as trustee, the stockholders being the cestuis que trust, both in a qualified sense, their only remedy for the refusal of the company to pay such dividends or to compel the proper discharge of the trust, is by resort to the Courts. It was competent for the Legislature to have granted to the company, per se, as an artificial person and to vest in it as such, all the property, real, personal or mixed— this has been done in apt language; and to have distinguished the interest of the shareholders being natural persons, and to have declared that to be personal estate— that has been done; and to have conferred upon it immunity from taxation — this has been expressly granted; and to withhold such immunity from the company or its property. Gordon vs. Appeal Tax Court, 3 Howard, 150 . ■ The Legislature had also the power in the grant of the charter, to define the quality as well as the quantity of the property to he held by the company and the interest of the shareholders, and to make it real, personal or mixed property. 13 Wall., 264 ; 18 Wall., 229 -234; 20 Wall., 38 .

It is not the province of the Courts to determine what is property, or of what it shall consist, or with what faculties endowed, or what characteristics shall constitute the identity of any distinct species, real, personal or mixed. That is not a judicial hut a legislative function. 85 The Legislature in designating the stock as personal estate, intended it as such to be treated; but it does not hence follow, that it designed to make the property of the company, in its entirety, personal estate ; on the contrary, the terms employed show that the Legislature intended no such thing, but just the reverse; to leave the property of the company unconverted, and to remain just as it was, real, personal or mixed. See Mayor & C. C. of Balto. vs. B. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 292 ; Prov. Bank vs. Billings, 4 Peters, 561 ; Phila. & Wil.

R. R. Co. vs. Maryland, 10 Howard, 393 ; Erie R. R. Co. vs. Penn., 21 Wallace, 498. There is no doubt of the power of the Legislature to have imposed taxes upon either, or both, or to have exempted one or both, or whilst exempting the one, to leave the other subject to the power of taxation'. See Emory vs. State, 41 Md., 38 , and authorities before referred to. If it had been the intention to exempt the company, a few words would have been sufficient, and there could have been no question upon the subject.

The 15th Art. of the Bill of Rights has provided by its mandate, for the imposition of taxes upon persons holding property, if such resort were necessary. That Article further cautiously and carefully provides, that such mandate is not to be considered as a denial of the right of the State to impose other taxes, deemed necessary, upon grounds of public policy. The one clause is as mandatory as the other ; the integrity of the declaration cannot be severed ; both provisions, (or one with the qualification of the other,) must be considered to give proper meaning and effect to it. To take the first clause and ignore the latter, contravenes the intention.

Fully aware of the purport of this great principle of taxation, the Legislature may have intended by the terms 86 employed to exempt the shares of stock, but not the property of the company upon principles of public policy. To the Legislature, this sovereign right of taxation or exemption is entrusted, to be exercised according to the mandate of the Bill of Rights. If it acts without due discretion or oppressively, the remedy is not to be sought through the Courts, but with the people, who have the power to discharge faithless agents. See State vs. Cumb. & Penn.

R. R. Co., 40 Md., 22 , and other references in the dissenting opinion in that case; State vs. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 501 ; Mayor of Balto. vs. Balto. & O. R. R., 4 Gill, 292 ; Providence Bank, 4 Peters, 563 ; McCulloh vs. State, 4 Wheaton, 428 ; Howell vs. State, 3 Gill, 24 . Whenever it undertakes to grant the exemption from taxation, it must be clearly expressed. It must not be inferred except from necessary implication. McCulloh vs. State, 4 Wheaton, 428 .

The power of taxation or exemption, being from its nature a sovereign attribute, and residing by the terms of the organic law in the Legislature, the Courts have very limited authority to direct, regulate, or trench upon its prerogative. They are wisely relieved of the political duty of determining what shall, or not be the subject of taxation or exemption, or in what way the Legislature should exercise its power. It is well that it is a political, and not a judicial function of the Government. The Legislature is the direct and authentic representative of the people, the source of power in the exercise of this high authority.

They make the laws — The Courts expound them. There can be no clashing if each moves in its proper orbit. Immunities from this vital power of taxation granted in charters of incorporation of perpetual existence, having been determined by the Courts to be contracts, or in the 87 nature of contracts, vesting rights accordingly; the people of this State have deemed it a proper precaution, in their organic law, to restrain the power of the Legislature upon the subject. The 48th sec. of the 3rd Art. of the Constitution, amongst other things, provides, by the last clause thereof, “that all charters granted or adopted, in pursuance thereof, and all charters heretofore granted and created, subject to repeal or modification, may he altered from time to time, or he repealed.” The propriety of the pretension of considering, the exemption of a corporation from the power of taxation, as a contract irrepealable in its nature, has been much questioned, as calculated essentially to impair, if not destroy, the indispensable and sovereign attribute of the State; the power to sustain its government by taxation.

It would seem that if exemption is construed to be in the nature of a contract, and as such irrepealable by the State, and beyond the possibility of destruction by condemnation under the power of eminent domain, it virtually amounts to the establishment of the extraordinary doctrine that the Legislature of a State, upon this subject of taxation, may contract for its surrender. If this he true, the State may be deprived of all of its attributes of sovereignty, one after another, so far as the Legislature may have authority to bind the State by such contract. Could the contract be disaffirmed as one against the principles of public policy? The objections to such a pretension when applied to the power of taxation l>3r a government are of serious import.

Fortunately for this State now, no succeeding Legislature has the authority by the grant of chartered privilege and exemption to create such contract, and to affix irrepealable limits upon its successors, hut each in its succession must be left free to exercise its entire constitutional authority without such restraint. 88 But. assuming that the Legislature, by the terms of sec. 18 of the charter, did intend to exempt, not only the stock, but the company, and that the stock was considered as representing the company and the property thereof; what is the extent thereof, or what did the Legislature intend to be exempted? They were providing for the construction of a road from the City of Baltimore to some point on the Ohio river, by the charter granted to the company, and to exempt any capital stock required therefor, and the property it represented, according to the concession — whatever means, money or property were necessary for the completion of the road, including tracks, if necessary, to the full extent of its road-bed; with any lateral roads connecting therewith, and all necessary or useful appurtenances suitable and adapted for such a highway. This was the extent, embracing all of its fixed property, with all necessary, useful or convenient adjuncts. "Whatever the corporation holds outside, or in excess of these reservations, is liable to taxation, according to the discretion of the Legislature, upon such theory of construction.

As to the manner of taxation, I have no doubt of the power of the Legislature to impose a direct tax upon the property of the company; or upon the gross receipts thereof, as their judgment may determine. But conceding all this to be the status of the company, in regard to taxation, under the provisions of the 18th sec. of the charter, we are confronted with the grave provisions of the Act of 1835, ch. 395, and the effect to be given to the 15th sec. thereof, commonly known as the eight million loan bill. Whilst the company is claiming that the State should' deal with it, upon the highest good faith, and uberrima fides should be the standard, which" is quite just; there must be a reciprocal obligation on its part to observe its contract. 89 The principles of good faitli must be maintained at all events by the State with this company, as with all others of its creation. If the exemption from taxation was granted to it by its charter, and it has since surrendered that immunity for a valuable and tona fide consideration, it can be held to its engagement, and to have parted with such exemption from the power of taxation.

The 1st sec. of the Act of 1835 provides, that upon the assent and agreement to the several provisions of the Act, by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, these companies being the chief beneficiaries under the law, respectively, the Treasurer of the State should subscribe to the capital stock of each corporation the sum of three millions of dollars, and pay for the same in the manner and upon the conditions thereinafter mentioned. One of the conditions requires that a majority of the State directors should certify under oath, that in their opinion and judgment, such subscription by the State would, in addition to other subscriptions, be sufficient to complete the road to the Ohio river. The company, by acceding to the provisions of this Act and accepting its benefits, agreed to all the provisions thereof, and solemnly stipulated to abandon any exemption from the power of taxation on the part of the State; if such be the purport of the Act, and the company has thus contracted to surrender such right to the State, if ever given to it. This subject will be found referred to in the case of the B. & O. R. R. Co. vs. The State, 36 Md., 529 .

The difficulty in that case grew out of the construction to be given to the contract between the State and company, arising out of the provision of this Act, as to the medium of payment by which the company could discharge itself from the obligation of the contract. 90 The State, claiming to he paid in gold, as it had such coin to pay on the bonds given to the company, treating the contract between the parties as one of indemnity. The company, on the contrary, insisting that payment could be made in legal tender notes of the United States. The difference in the medium of payment being some $289,489. This was determined by this Court against the State, because of the decisions of the Supreme Court, in the cases of Knox vs. Lee and Parker vs. Davis, 12 Wall., 457 , adjudicating that debts could be paid in legal tender notes.

Probably, besides the consequences to this State, this decision of the Supreme Court, reversing by a bare majority the former contrary judgment of that Court, has had not only the effect to disturb the integrity of contracts, but to unsettle and derange the currency and business of the country, more then all other causes combined. The majority of this Court rested its judgment upon the authority of that decision. It is questionable, in my opinion, if the case had been carried to the Supreme Court, it would have determined that this case between the State and company, came within the general class of cases to which that ruling was intended to apply. It is clear, at least to my apprehension, that it was understood by the State and the company, and all parties interested, that by this well considered Act, the State designed to become re-invested with its original attribute of sovereignty over the subject of taxation, if it had parted with any ; and the company,- by acceptance of its provisions, intended to abandon any right to exemption.

If such is not the meaning of the 15th section, it would be difficult to provide more definite terms. It is specifically and emphatically declaratory of such purpose. • The following are the terms employed in that section: “And be it enacted, that in case it shall be necessary, at any time hereafter, to levy a direct tax for the support 91 of Government, or to sustain the public credit, the same shall he laid according to the \?yth Art. of the Declaration of Rights, including all goods, wares and merchandise, belonging to citizens of this State, ships and vessels, in or out of port, moneys at interest on mortgage, bond or any chose in action, stock and public securities of every description, and all income derived from shares of every incorporated institution, or otherwise, as well as every other description of property, real, personal or mixed, which escapes taxation under existing laws; and the faith of the State is hereby pledged to pay the same accordingly, in consideration hereof, and to provide for the payment of interest, and the reimbursement of principal of debts to be created in virtue of this Act, or of debts which may he created at any subsequent Legislature; and all Acts and parts of Acts in contravention of the constitutional and equitable principles herein contained, shall thenceforward be repealed, abrogated and annulled. ’ ’ Upon the passage of this Act of 1835, with its solemn and sweeping provisions, and its acceptance by the company, and the stockholders thereof, both company and stockholders, in keeping with the provisions of the Act of 1826, creating the company ; it followed as a necessai’y consequence, that all exemption of the company, its property, stock and franchises, if any existed under previous legislation, was absolutely and unqualifiedly surrendered to the taxing power of the State. The company and its stockholders now occupy the same ground, and are subject to the same authority of the State as other corporations or stockholders, and must look to the Legislature for the redress of all grievances, or relief from the burden of taxation, so far as it has authority to interfere upon that subject or otherwise. Bowie, J., filed the following dissenting opinion : With profound respect for the great learning and ability of the Bench which decided the earlier tax cases in this State, upon which all the subsequent decisions depend, I am unable to concur in the doctrine supposed to he established by them, viz., that the shares of stock in a joint stock corporation, represent all the franchises and property, real and personal, which the corporation acquires and holds, and consequently the exemption of the shares is an exemption of the franchises and property of the corporation.

According to the best modern authorities, “A share of stock is a right to partake, according to the amount of the party’s subscription, of the surplus profits obtained from the use and disposal of the capital stock of the company to those purposes for which the company is constituted.” Angell &. Ames on Corp., sec. 557, (8th Edition.) “The land, buildings ,etc., of canal, turnpike and railroad companies are the mere instruments whereby the joint stock of the company is made to produce that profit; and, moreover, belong exclusively- to the corporate body, which is altogether a separate person from the individual members.” Ibid., sec. 557; Bligh vs. Brent, 3 Young & C. Exch., 268, 294; Rex vs. The Hull Dock Company, 1 Term Rep., 219. In the case last referred to, it was held, “that lands purchased by the company and converted into a dock, were ratable to the poor, although the Act of Parliament declared the shares should be personal estate'; the rate was upon the property in the hands of the company, and not on the share of the individual proprietor.” “The capital stock of a corporation, is not necessarily, the limit of its property.” Barry vs. Merch. Ex.

Co., 1 Sand. Ch., 280 ; South Bay Meadow Co. vs. Gray, 30 Maine Rep., 547. “The sound doctrine’ in equity is, that the capital or property, and debts due to corporations constitute a trust 93 fund, pledged to the payment of the dues of creditors and stockholders.” 1 Angell & Ames, sec. 779 a; Curran vs. The State of Ark., 15 How., 312 ; 2 Kent Com., 307, n. a; Hightower vs. Thornton, 8 Georgia, 493; Bacon vs. Robertson, 18 How., 480 . It appears from these authorities, which -might be multiplied indefinitely, that the property of the corporation and the shares of stock of a joint stock corporation are not only not vested in the same persons, but are essentially different things, which cannot represent each other, more than a part can cover the whole. Figuratively speaking, a part may be put for the whole, but legally, the greater is never included in the less.

In the absence of express language, susceptible of no other interpretation, we cannot impfite to the Legislature any such purpose. “That the taxing power is of vital importance — that it is essential to the existence of government, are truths which it cannot be necessary to re-affirm. They are acknowledged and asserted by all. It would seem that the relinquishment of such a power is never to be assumed. We will not say, that a State may not relinquish it; that a consideration sufficiently valuable to induce a partial release of it may not exist; but as the whole community is interested in retaining it undiminished, that community has a right to insist, that its abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in which the deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it, does not appear.” Marshall, C. J., 4 Peters, 561 ; adopted by the Court of Appeals in Gordon’s Ex’r vs. Mayor & City Council of Balto., 5 Gill, 231 .

All persons, (natural or legal,) holding property in this State, are bound to contribute their proportions of public taxes for the support of the Government, according to their actual worth in real or personal property, and duties, or taxes, may properly and justly be imposed, or laid, with a political view, for the good government and benefit of the community. Art. 15, Dec. of Rights. 94 This clause of the Declaration of Rights, whilst it expressly asserts equality should he the general rule in imposing taxes, explicitly asserts that other taxes may he laid with a political view for the good government and benefit of the commonwealth, and impliedly prohibits exemption. There is no clause in the Declaration of Rights, prohibiting double taxation in express terms, and notwithstanding the general rule indicated by the 15th clause above cited, which has formed a part of that Declaration, since the organization of the State, it has been the constant practice of the Legislature, to lay taxes on its citizens, not only according to their actual worth in real and personal property, but on their business, or vocation; thus banks, merchants, auctioneers, corporations, hotels, theatres, lawyers and physicians, have been specially taxed; and not only the learned professions, which have a species of monopoly, hut the oystermen and laborer. The transportation of passengers and freight by railroad corporations is a great franchise, immunity, or privilege, conferred by the State on the company, by virtue of its sovereign power, and founded in a great measure upon the exercise of the right of eminent domain, which may he called the “ ultima ratio ” of the civil power. ' When the B. & O. R. R. Company was incorporated with a perpetual charter, designed to unite the City of Baltimore with the Ohio and the great West, the General Assembly, after investing the company, as a corporation, with the most liberal powers, declared by its 18th section, ‘ ‘ that the road or roads ivith all their works, improvements and profits, and the machinery are vested in the said company, and their successors forever, and the shares of the capital stock of said company shall he deemed and considered personal estate and shall he exempt from the imposition of any tax or burden by the States assenting to this law.” The company claim exemption under this section from all taxation by the State, the City of Baltimore, or the 95 Counties through which the road runs, on the ground, that the shares of the capital stock are declared personal estate, and exempt from imposition of any tax or burden.

And this interpretation it is said, is fixed beyond all question by the decision of this Court in 6 Gill, 288 , which held “that the specific property of a company was as much an ingredient in the shares of stock, and component part of their value, as is any portion of the corporate property of the company, so that if the one be exempt from taxation under express legislation, so also is the other.” It has been urged with great force that the interpretation given the 18th section, of the charter of the B. & O. R. R. Co., by the Court in 6 Gill, is sustained by the language of the charter granted by this State to the Potowmac Company in 1784, and the Ches. & O. C. Company in 1824. There could not be a stronger illustration of the proposition, that exemption when intended to be given by the Legislature, is granted in clear and emphatic terms, than the examples furnished in the 9th clauses of those several charters. These corporations were the creations of two States, erected by distinct charters in each, by inter-State legislation. They were designed to establish a great highway, between the Eastern and Western waters.

There was no monopoly of the right of transportation, they were free to all who paid the tolls. But the B. & O. R. R. Company sustains no such relation to other States, it is exclusively a Maryland corporation, with the franchises of building and working a railroad through the territory of such States as. intervene between Baltimore and the Ohio. At the meeting of the citizens of Baltimore held on the 19th Eeby., 1827, preliminary to applying to the Legislature of Maryland for a charter, it was resolved, that the assent of the Legislatures of Pennsylvania and Virginia to 96 the said Act shall he obtained as speedily as possible, hut shall be necessary, only so far as in constructing the said road, it shall he found necessary to pass through their respective States. They wanted no corporate power from the assenting States, further than a right of way through the same.

To guard against any assumption of authority over the corporation or its stock, the 18th section of the charter, after declaring “ it shall not be lawful for any other company or any person or persons whatsoever to travel upon or use any of the roads of the company, etc., without license or permission of the president and directors of said company, and that the said road or roads with all their works, improvements and profits, and all the machinery used on said road are hereby vested in the said company, incorporated by this Act, and their successors forever ; and the shares of the capital stock of the said company, shall he deemed and considered personal estate, and shall be exempt from the imposition of any tax or burthen by the States assenting to this law.” The plain unvarnished meaning and office of the section cited, was to assert the absolute control of the company over the road for travel and transportation; the absolute proprietorship of the corporation in its visible and tangible property, real and personal, and their profits, forever; and the legal status of the shares of stock to he personal estate, (which notwithstanding the general rule is subject to the “ lex clomi” of the owner,) shall be exempt from tax by the States of Pennsylvania and Virginia. There was no attempt to exempt the road, works and improvements, etc., as such from taxation by the assenting States, (and it is understood they have been continuously taxed in Western Virginia,) hut notwithstanding the obvious distinction drawn in the law, between the road, works, etc., and the shares of stock, it is gravely contended that the real tangible indivisible property of the corpora 97 tion, capable at-all times of being estimated at its proper situs, is represented by an incorporeal, intangible, contingent interest, incapable of any certain value and distributed wherever its owners may reside, and converted into personalty — the exemption of which from taxation by the States assenting to the laiu, is an exemption by the State enacting the law, of all power of taxation over the corpus or body of the appellee’s real and personal estate. The^exemption of the shares of the capital stock by the assenting States, is. the exclusion of exemption as to the road, works, etc., by the enacting State, as “ expressio unius, est exclusio alterius.” In my judgment, the Legislature of Maryland never entertained the legal fiction, that the shares of capital stock, represented the lands, houses, road, machinery, etc.; that a part was equal to the whole — there was no judicial authority for such a position at that period, as far as I have investigated. The case of the Hull Dock Company above cited, established the contrary, viz., although the shares were made personal estate by the charter, the property in the hands of the company was liable to tax as realty.

The doctrine that the stock of a corporation, represents its whole property, originates in this State, in the decision known as the Tax Cases, decided in 12 G. & J., 117 , in which no opinion was delivered by the Court, and the propositions supposed to be sustained by the Court, are deduced by the Reporter from the arguments of the counsel, whose resj)ective cases were affirmed, or rejected. The most sanguine lawyer must acknowledge that this is a very unsatisfactory basis for building a theory upon, which is to control the legislation of the State forever. The doctrine was repeated in the case of Gordon vs. The Mayor & City Council of Balto., 5 Gill, 231 , and no authority cited, except 12 G. & J., and thus sounded, the refrain was taken up and repeated in the case of The 98 Mayor, &c. of Balt. vs. The B. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, and others since determined on its authority. No chain can he stronger than each of its several links, and if the first is unsound,the whole series is so.

Although many cases are to be found in other States, in which language may be employed, corresponding with that used by the Court in 6 Gill, yet many of those were cases of banking corporations, or others, in which the capital stock, valued at par, might, without any violation of principle, be said to represent all the property of the corporations, but the weight of authority in the United States and in England, as collected and cited in the appellant’s briefs is otherwise. I am painfully conscious of the responsibility which a Judge incurs in departing from former decisions of a Court of final resort. The rule “stare decisis,” is one of the most sacred in the law. It is not a wise administration of justice to oppose a current of authorities, where they are to be found.

Authorities established are so many laws, and receding from them, unsettles property, etc. “The Judges now (as their predecessors have always done,) bow down to the rule (of stare decisis,) ‘pro salute populi ’ — which is .the supreme law of every community. ” What the safety of the commonwealth demands, is a momentous problem. Whether it is better to joersist in error, than to review and correct it, is the position those are placed in who believe the former decision wrong. The author on Legal Judgment says, “it may often be difficult to draw the line, at which it must be considered that a doctrine is settled, or a point closed, and therefore to be adhered to ; or to say when it is not too late to review such doctrine or point. There may be a time when it is not too late to make that review.

My own personal experience tells me, says Graham Brun, that nothing is more common, than 99 that a legal notion, though founded on judicial decisions, may prevail for a series of years in Westminster Hall as being of decided cases, which have been decided to be wrong, and when so discovered, has been corrected by subsequent determinations.” * * * * ‘' The case of Moses vs. Macferlan, was considered for law between thirty and forty years, till the Court, reconsidering the grounds of that decision, overruled it altogether and came back to the true principle in the case of Harriot vs. Hampton, where Lord Kenyon and the rest of the Court individually, refused to recognize the law of the former case, although very solemnly determined after mature consideration and an elaborate judgment.” Ram on Legal Judgment, 128, 129, 130. This is not, strictly speaking " res judicata,” but “res integra.” In 6 Gill, the doctrine of exemption as apjdied to the appellee in this case, was first announced in a suit between the Mayor and C. C. of Balto., and the appellee. The direct question there, was whether the City bad the power to tax. It was held, the stock being exempted from State taxation, “afortiori” the City, which was but a municipality of the State, had no power to tax.

The State was no party to that suit, and was not bound by it, and no occasion has arisen since requiring the doctrine to be reviewed. It is in fact" res integra” as to the State. The parent case 12 G. & J., 117 , from which the doctrine sprung, was prolific of various propositions, some of which are denied by those who insist on 6 Gill as authority. The 7th section of the Act of 1821, ch. 131, required the banks to pay a certain bonus for the extension of their charters, and the 11th declared that upon any of them accepting and complying with the terms of the Act, the faith of the State was thereby pledged not to impose any further tax or burden upon them, etc. 100 These sections were held to exempt the banks from further tax or charge by the State, for their franchise or banking privileges, but not to exempt the property belonging to such banks, or the shares of stock held therein by individuals; drawing a broad distinction between the franchise, and the property and shares, declaring the exemption of the”one is not the exemption of the other.

From the proposition declared in that case, that “the property of the bank being represented by the shares of stock therein, both cannot be taxed, and therefore when the tax is imposed on the stock in the hands of shareholders, the property of the bank, real or personal, cannot be taxed,” Dorsey, J., is represented as dissenting. Yet, this proposition is the gist of the whole opinion of the Court delivered by him in 6 Gill. The 11th section of the Act of 1821, ch. 131, declared “ that upon any of the aforesaid banks accepting and complying with the terms and conditions of this Act, the faith of the State is hereby pledged not to impose any further tax or burden upon them, during the continuance of their charter under this Act.” The banks contended that this clause restrained not only the Legislature from imposing additional taxes upon the banks, but also the city from assessing them. This construction of the clause was repudiated by the Court, which held that the exemption could not be allowed, unless the Court -was satisfied “that an intention to liberate the bank from city as well as State taxation, is clearly and indisputably expressed.” This proposition they held was established by adjudications both in England and the United States, which were cited at considerable length, and with these for their guide they declared, that although the Act exempted the banks from State taxation, it did not exempt them from city taxation, “that the exemption claimed by the appellant cannot be' sustained unless the Court is satisfied that 101 an intention to liberate the bank from city, as well as State taxation is clearly and indisputably expressed * * “if the object of the contract had been as is maintained by the counsel for the appellant, to exempt the banks from all taxation whether imposed by the State or city, it is impossible to believe that the parties would not have employed more comprehensive terms, and have used language better calculated to accomplish their purpose.” Apply this principle of construction to the 18th section of the charter of the appellee, and what is the necessary conclusion ?

Are the States assenting to the law, and the State enacting the law the same? Are they not as distinct as the City and the State governments? Is the intention to liberate the visible property of the corporation from taxation clearly and indisputably expressed ? Does it appear beyond all doubt and ambiguity, that the State of Maryland meant under this vague implication to divest itself forever, of one of the vital powers of sovereignty?

In the language of the Court in 5 Gill, 239 , paraphrazed, “on this point my opinion is adverse to the claim asserted by the appellee.”