Maryland case law › Taylor v. Sindall

Taylor v. Sindall

34 Md. 38 (1871) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: ReversedBartol, C. J.✓ Good law
SummaryThis is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas rendered June 28, 1870, striking out a prior judgment that had been entered in favor of the appellants against the appellee on March 15, 1865. The motion to strike out was filed May 31, 1870, and assigned as cause 'irregularities on the face of the proceedings.' The Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief Judge Bartol, first recognized that the power to set aside judgments on motion for fraud, surprise, or irregularity is a common law power incident to courts of record, exercisable after the term in which the judgment was rendered, as recognized by the Act of 1787, ch. 9, sec. 6, reenacted in Code, Article 75, section 38, and construed in Butterfield v. Levy. The Court then applied the rules and principles stated in Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. 138, which held that relief will not be granted where a party has knowingly acquiesced in
Questions presented
  • Whether the court below erred in striking out the judgment of March 15, 1865, on motion filed May 31, 1870, alleging irregularities on the face of the proceedings, where the appellee had acquiesced in the judgment for more than five years and had been guilty of laches and unreasonable delay in seeking relief.
  • Whether the motion to strike out the judgment was barred because the grounds of objection to the judgment had already been presented by objections to the award and finally adjudged and determined, making the matter res adjudicata.
📖 Open the full case in RecordCite — full opinion, AI chat, highlights & citator →

Bartol, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, rendered on the 28th day of June, 1870, striking out a judgment which had been rendered in the same Court in favor of the appellants against the appellee, on the 15th day of March, 1865. The motion to strike out the judgment was filed on the 31st day of May, 1870, and the cause assigned in support of the motion was alleged “ irregularities on the face of the proceedings.” The power to set aside judgments on motion for fraud, surprise or irregularity, is a common law power incident to Courts of record; and may be exercised after the term has passed in which the judgment was rendered. Kemp, et al. vs. Cook, et al., 18 Md., 138 .

The power was recognized by the Act of 1787, ch. 9, section 6, which has been reenacted in the Code, Article 75, section 38, which was construed by this Court in Butterfield vs. Levy, decided at October Term, 1868, and noted in, 30 Md., among the unreported cases. 41 (Decided 10th February, 1871.) The rules and principles governing the Court in deciding upon applications of this kind, made after the term has passed, are fully stated in the case of Kemp, et al. vs. Cook, et al. It is there said that relief will not be granted where a party has knowingly acquiesced in the judgment complained of, or has been guilty of laches and unreasonable delay in seeking his remedy.” We think the present case falls within that rule, and that the long acquiescence of the appellee in the judgment rendered against him in March, 1865, and his laches and delay in waiting more than five years before making his application for relief, which is without any explanation or excuse, would of itself be a sufficient cause for overruling the motion. But there is another and fatal objection to granting the motion. The judgment complained of was entered upon an award made by Win. Sheppard Bryan, Esq., filed in Court.

It appears by the record that objections were made to the award, which were overruled and the judgment thereon was entered, blow it is evident that all the grounds of objection to the judgment raised by the motion to strike it out, were presented by the objections to the award, and were then finally adjudged and determined. It is therefore res adjudicata, and cannot again be brought in question in the same case. For these reasons, we think, the Court below was in error in sustaining the motion; and the judgment of the 28th day of June, 1870, striking out the antecedent judgment of the 15th day of March,. 1865, will be reversed. Judgment reversed.