Maryland case law › Tyson v. Tyson

Tyson v. Tyson

31 Md. 134 (1869) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: ReversedAlvey✓ Good law
SummaryThis case involved a bill in equity to correct a mistake in a deed executed on February 12, 1866, by which Mrs. Tyson and her husband conveyed certain property. The complainants alleged that the deed was not intended to divest Mrs. Tyson of a power of disposal over the property that had been conferred by an earlier deed of May 6, 1864. The Court of Appeals found that the proof was full and clear as to the design and purpose of the 1866 deed and that it was not intended to divest Mrs. Tyson of her disposing power. However, the lower court had dismissed the bill on the ground that the object to be accomplished by the 1866 deed was not within the purview of the disposing power given by the 1864 deed. The Court of Appeals disagreed with that construction. The 1864 deed gave Mrs. Tyson a full and complete power of disposal during the life of her present husband and with his assent, to sell, m
Questions presented
  • Whether the object to be accomplished by the deed of February 12, 1866, was within the purview of the disposing power given by the deed of May 6, 1864.
  • Whether the power of disposal given by the deed of May 6, 1864, required reinvestment of the proceeds of sale as a condition of its valid execution.
📖 Open the full case in RecordCite — full opinion, AI chat, highlights & citator →

Alvey, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The mistake alleged in this ease appears with sufficient certainty to entitle the complainants to have it corrected. The proof is full and clear as to the design and purpose of the deed of the 12th of February, 1866, and that it was not intended to divest Mrs. Tyson of her disposing power over the property, conferred by the deed of the 6th of May, 1864. Rut the ground upon which relief was denied by the Court below was, that the object to be accomplished by the deed of the 12th of February, 1866, was not within the purview of the disposing power given by the deed of the 6th of May, 1864; and hence the bill was dismissed.

In the opinion of the Court below, however, we do not concur. The power of disposal, given by the deed of the 6th of May, 1864, is full and complete, if exercised during the life of the present husband, and with his assent. The power is, “ to sell, mortgage, or otherwise dispose of, and to grant the said property and the proceeds to reinvest in such other estate and property as she may think proper.” The property is conveyed to Mrs. Tyson, and to her personal representatives and assigns, to be held as her separate estate, during the life of her present or future husband, and, if she survive, then with power to devise, and after her deat h, in case no sale or other disposition shall be made by the said Julia McH. Tyson, under the aforesaid powers, and in so far as no such disposition may have been made by her,” then to be held by her children.

The deed conveying the estate to Mrs. Tyson makes no provision with reference to any powers or limitations to which the estate acquired by reinvestment shall be subject, and our construction of the language in reference to reinvesting the proceeds of sale is, that it is rather suggestive than imperative ; and that if she were to sell or otherwise dispose of the property, the legality of the execution of the power would not depend upon the reinvestment of the proceeds. 138 The language of the disposing power is exceedingly broad and comprehensive, and the construction which we place upon it is irresistible, when we consider the event upon which the property is limited over to the children of Mrs. Tyson, after her death, namely, “ in case no sale or other disposition shall be made by the said Julia McH. Tyson, under the aforesaid powers.” If it had been designed that the property, or its pi’oceeds, should have remained in settlement, why such a provision as this ? See 1 Sugd. on Pow., 522; 2 Sugd. on Pow., 429. (Decided 25th June, 1869.) We shall reverse the decree of the Court below, and remand the cause, that the proper decree may be passed giving the relief prayed by the bill.

Under the circumstances of the case, the appellants must pay the costs. Decree reversed, and cause remanded, with costs to the appellees.