Maryland case law › Vitek v. State

Vitek v. State

295 Md. 35 (1982) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: AffirmedMurphy, C. J.✓ Good law
SummaryThis opinion is a dissent by Chief Judge Murphy, joined by Judge Smith, in a criminal appeal. The majority held that the trial judge erred by allowing the prosecutor to question the defendant, Vitek, about his need for money. The dissent agrees with that holding but would find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and would affirm the conviction. The dissent explains that evidence of motive, including lack of or need for money as a motive for pecuniary gain crimes, is generally admissible. However, because a desire for pecuniary gain is virtually universal, evidence of a defendant's mere employment or financial status has little additional probative value and should not be admitted unless the State can show a desperate need for money or some special circumstance making the defendant's financial status specially relevant. Here, the prosecutor's questioning failed to demonstrate any
Questions presented
  • Whether the trial judge erred by allowing questioning on Vitek's need for money.
  • Whether the error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Murphy, C. J., dissenting: Although I do not fully share the majority’s reasoning process, I do concur with the holding that, in the circumstances of this case, the trial judge erred by allowing questioning on Vitek’s need for money. However, since I find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I respectfully dissent. The authorities and our cases are virtually unanimous in 47 allowing evidence of motive to be admitted, e.g., Gross v. State, 235 Md. 429, 445 , 201 A.2d 808, 817 (1964); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 363 (1967); R. Perkins, Criminal Law Ch. 7, § 9 (2d ed. 1969), including the lack of or need for money as a motive for crimes committed for pecuniary gain.

See Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 839 , §§ 9, 11 (1971 & Supp. 1982); 1 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 172 (13th ed. 1972). Even those authorities which disapprove of the practice, see 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 392(2)(a), (3rd ed. 1940), do so not because such evidence of motive is irrelevant, but rather because its relevance is outweighed by the prejudicial effect it may have upon impecunious defendants. As the majority makes clear, a desire for pecuniary gain is virtually universal, regardless of financial status, and a general state of impoverishment need not be shown to establish a motive for pecuniary gain crimes. However, the majority concedes that "under special circumstances,” the financial condition of a defendant may be admissible, where, for instance, there is a "desperate” need for money.

I agree that the mere employment or financial status of a person is of such little additional probative value, given the presumption of motive in pecuniary gain crimes, that it should not be admitted in light of the possible prejudice that would attach to those who cannot rebut the inference of financial need. When evidence of financial status is proffered, the court should determine whether the evidence will show that there is either a desperate need for money or some special circumstance which makes the defendant’s financial status or desire for money of special relevance before such evidence is admitted. See, e.g., Gross v. State, 235 Md. 429 , 201 A.2d 808 (1964). Here, the prosecutor’s line of questioning utterly failed to demonstrate that there was any financial need, much less a desperate need, and there was error in not sustaining the objection.

Of course, in order to constitute reversible error, the evidence improperly admitted must work some prejudice to 48 the defendant. See cases cited in 36 A.L.R.3d 839 §§ 14-18. Here the defendant voluntarily disclosed to the jury that he had just been released from jail. A further question on his employment status was not objected to, nor has Vitek made the revelation of his employment status an issue.

Rather, it is a question about the need for money to which Vitek objected, and to which he devotes the bulk of his argument. However, there is simply no evidence or inferences that reasonably could be drawn from the evidence in this case that Vitek needed money at the time of the crime. The only evidence adduced was that Vitek had no such need. While, in the circumstances, the inquiry itself was improper, I am unwilling to conclude that the mere asking of the question warrants reversal of the conviction.

I am able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no prejudice to Vitek within the contemplation of the harmless error rule enunciated in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 , 350 A.2d 665 (1976). I would affirm the conviction. Judge Smith has authorized me to state that he joins me in the views expressed herein.