Maryland case law › Whitney v. Wyman

Whitney v. Wyman

24 Md. 131 (1866) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: AffirmedCochran, J.✓ Good law
SummaryThis case involved a consignment of goods by Ripka & Co. to the appellees (factors), who made advances on the goods without any instructions as to time, mode, or rate of sale. After the advances were made, the consignors sent a letter fixing minimum sale prices. The appellant, Whitney, as assignee or representative of the consignors, sought to hold the factors liable for selling below those limits. The Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Cochran, reaffirmed the settled rule that a factor who receives goods on consignment without limiting instructions and makes advances or incurs liabilities acquires a special property in the goods and the right to sell so much as necessary to reimburse advances or meet liabilities. The consignor cannot, by a subsequent order, control that right of sale except as to surplus goods, unless the consignor stands ready and offers to reimburse the advances
Questions presented
  • Whether a factor who receives goods on consignment without any limit as to time, mode, or rate of sale, and makes advances or incurs liabilities on account of the goods, acquires a special property and right to sell so much as necessary to reimburse advances or meet liabilities, and whether the consignor can control that right by a subsequent order without offering to reimburse the advances or liabilities.
  • Whether the letter of December 10, 1861, fixing limits below which the goods were not to be sold, affected the appellees' existing right to sell according to the usual course, given that it was written long after the advances were made and there was no offer to reimburse.
  • Whether the communications between the appellees and the appellant relieved the case from the operation of the rule, or instead authorized a variance or disregard of the limits.
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Cochran, J., delivered the opinion of this Court. We understand it to be finally settled, that a factor, who receives goods on consignment, without any limit as to 142 time, mode, or rate of sale, and makes advances or incurs liabilities on account of the goods consigned, thereby acquires a special property in them, and a right to sell, according to the usual course of his duty, so much thereof as may he necessary to reimburse such advances or meet such liabilities ; and further, that the consignor has no right, by any order given after the advances have been made or liabilities incurred, to control this right of sale, except so far as relates to the surplus of the goods not necessary for the reimbursement of such advances or liabilities, unless he stands ready, and offers to reimburse the advances or liabilities. Brown vs. McGran. 14 Peters, 479 . The consignments in this case were general ; the appellees having received, and made their advances on them, without any instructions from the consignors in regard to the selling prices, time, or mode of sale.

The letter of the 10th of December 1861, fixing limits below which the goods were not to be sold, was written long after the appellees received the consignments and made the advances, and there 'is nothing in the record to show that the consignors offered or tendered themselves ready to reimburse the advances, either at the time or after this letter was written ; nor do the appellees appear to have assented to, or agreed with them, to comply with the instructions it contained. Under these circumstances, the limit put on the goods by the consignors was not of a character to affect in any degree the then existing right of the appellees to sell according to the usual course in such cases ; and, in that particular it is admitted that they acted in good faith, and obtained the best market price for the goods sold. We find nothing in the communications from the appellees to the appellant, nor in his reply to them to relieve the case from the operation of the rule stated. That of the former was a simple request for the views or wishes of the latter in 143 regard to the unsold goods, and Ms reply, contained in the letter to Mr. Dobbin, instead of requiring them to regard the limits prescribed in the December letter from Ripka & Co., clearly authorized such a variance or disregard of them as would enable the appellees to sell the goods.

The clear inference from all the correspondence offered in evidence, is that the appellees were to sell the goods in the exercise of a sound discretion, and as there is no pretence that they did not make the best possible disposition of them, we think there was no error in rejecting the appellant’s prayer, nor in granting the first and second of the appellees. (Decided March 2nd, 1866.) Judgment affirmed.