Maryland case law › Willingham v. Willingham

Willingham v. Willingham

162 Md. 539 (1932) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: AffirmedUrner, J.✓ Good law
SummaryThe parties were married in the District of Columbia, and the abandonment alleged by the plaintiff in her suit for divorce occurred there. The Maryland divorce statute (Code, art. 16, sec. 40) provides that no person shall be entitled to apply for a divorce where the causes for divorce occurred out of the State unless the plaintiff or defendant shall have resided within the State for two years next preceding the application. The plaintiff averred that she had resided in St. Mary's County for more than two years immediately prior to filing the bill on August 23, 1930, and that the defendant was a resident of the District of Columbia. The bill was dismissed by the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County on the ground that the evidence did not satisfactorily prove the plaintiff's residence in the State for the statutory period. The case proceeded under a decree pro confesso with no defense. The
Questions presented
  • Whether the evidence satisfactorily proved the plaintiff's residence in this State for the statutory period of two years next preceding the application for divorce, as required by Code, art. 16, sec. 40, where the causes for divorce occurred out of the State.
  • Whether the court below erred in assigning an unusually short time for the production of additional evidence and in not requiring the plaintiff and her father to be again called as witnesses.
📖 Open the full case in RecordCite — full opinion, AI chat, highlights & citator →

Urner, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The parties to this snit were married in the District of Columbia, and the abandonment alleged by the plaintiff in this suit for divorce occurred in that jurisdiction. The Maryland divorce statute provides: “No person shall be entitled to make application for a divorce, where the cauáes for divorce occurred out of this State, unless the party plaintiff or defendant shall have resided within this State for two years next preceding such application.” Code, art. 16, sec. 40. It is averred in the bill of complaint that the plaintiff has resided in St. Mary’s County, where the, bill was filed, for more than two years immediately prior to the institution of the suit, and that the defendant is a resident of the District of Columbia.

The bill was filed on August 23rd, 1930. It was dismissed by the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County on the ground that the evidence did not satisfactorily prove the plaintiff’s residence in this state for the statutory period before the suit. There was no defense in the case, which ■proceeded under a decree pro confesso. It was testified by the plaintiff that she had been a resident of St. Mary’s County for nearly four years, having lived there with her father, and that she is a voter in that county.

Her father testified that the plaintiff was living with him at Valley Lee in St. Mary’s County, and had resided there for more than two years. This testimony was taken before an examiner in November, 1930. The case having been presented to the court some months later, it passed an order stating that it was not satisfied with the testimony reported by the examiner, especially as to the plaintiff’s residence, and providing that additional testimony be taken in open court. At the time appointed by the order, two witnesses were produced on behalf of the plaintiff, and testified in effect that they had seen her at various times at a cottage owned by her father in St. Mary’s County, where he and his family spent the summer.

During the remainder 541 of the year they lived in Washington, and it was evidently there that the plaintiff’s vocation as a clerk was pursued. In September, 1930, shortly after the bill of complaint in this case was filed, the plaintiff and her father registered as voters in St. Mary’s County and voted at the primary election of that year. That fact would not be conclusive, in a divorce suit, as to their actual domicile at that time (Harrison v. Harrison, 117 Md. 607 , 84 A. 57 ), and it certainly does not support the essential allegation of residence in this state for the preceding two year period. The opinion of the lower court, in commenting’ upon the evidence, said that it “is far from being definite and specific, but is just such as is frequently given in ex parte divorce cases by nonresidents seeking the advantages of our Maryland law which permits an absolute divorce for desertion.” It was noted in the opinion that the testimony did not disclose under what conditions the plaintiff lived with her father in Washington during the greater part of the year, and that “only a minor portion of their time, at most one-fourth, is intermittently spent” in St. Mary’s County, “during the season when it is so customary for the city dwellers to leave their home to enjoy the summer months in the country.” The record justified the chancellor’s conclusion that the jurisdictional averment as to the fact and duration of the plaintiff’s residence in this state was not satisfactorily proved.

The brief of the appellant complains that the court below erred in assigning an unusually short time for the production of additional evidence, and in not requiring the plaintiff and her father to be again called as witnesses. There is no apparent .reason why they could not have been called at a later date if they had so desired. No leave of court for that purpose appears to have been requested. The final decree was not passed until September 30th, 1931, more than six weeks after the further testimony was produced.

The objection stated in the brief is therefore not sustainable. Decree affirmed, with, costs.